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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to extend the Fields’ (1989) multi sector job-search 
model by introducing international trade and capital. Two types of capital are considered: 
fixed capital and mobile capital. The effects of search intensity and the inflow of foreign 
capital on the volume and the rate of urban unemployment and on the social welfare are also 
examined in both of the two cases. The main finding is: more efficient on-the-job search 
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sectors. This is counterproductive to the standard result.  
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Job-search and FDI in a two-sector general equilibrium model  
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 
Job search is an integral part of the labour market. The idea of job search was first introduced 
by Burdett (1978). Originally, the search theory was formulated to analyse unemployment.   
The idea of job search has been incorporated in the models of  McCall (1970), Fields (1975, 
1989), Majumder (1975), Stark (1982), Adam and Cletus (1995), Postel-Vinay and Robin 
(2002), Dolado et al. (2009), Hussey (2005), Sheng and Xu (2007), Flinn and Mabli (2008), 
Arseneau and Chugh (2009), Macit (2010). 
 
McCall (1970) used the job search theory as a standard tool for analyzing the decision 
making process of a jobseeker. Fields (1975) considers three  types  of  job-search:  job  
search  from  the  agricultural sector, Job  search  from  the  urban  informal  sector  and  full-
time  job  search.  Fields (1989)  extends  his  earlier  model  to  distinguish  between  ex-ante  
job  search and  ex-post  employment. Stark (1982)  explains  job  search  in  a  two  period 
planning  horizon  where  search  technologies  are  not  sector  independent. Adam and 
Cletus (1995) present a simple model of job-search where an unemployed worker receives 
job offer, but he takes decision on whether to accept this offer based on a set of criteria. 
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) explain wage increase in terms of job search and bargaining 
theory. Dolado et al. (2003) consider a matching model with heterogeneous jobs and workers 
which allows for on-the–job search by mismatched workers. Hussey (2005) develops a 
general equilibrium business cycle model with on-the–job search and wage rigidity arising 
from long term labour contract. Sheng and Xu (2007) develop a simple two sector search 
model to examine the impact of the terms of trade (TOT) shocks on unemployment and they 
show that an improvement of TOT reduces unemployment. Flinn and Mabli (2008) analyse 
the impact of binding minimum wage on labour market outcomes and welfare in a partial 
equilibrium model of matching and bargaining in the presence of on-the-job search. 
Arseneau and Chugh (2009) introduce general equilibrium efficiency in the standard labour 
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search and matching framework. Macit (2010) develop a New Keynesian model in search 
and matching structure with firing costs and he shows how labour market institutions affect 
the wage and inflation dynamics. 
 
Another important concept in job search is the ‘graduation theory’, according to which, it is 
beneficial to remain in the urban informal sector1 and search part time for a highly paid job 
in the urban formal sector. However, this  theory  fails  in  the  following circumstances:  if  
the  urban  formal  sector directly  recruits  from  the  rural  sector  (see  Majumder, 1975),  if  
urban informal  sector  workers  prefer  self  employment  to  an  urban  formal  sector job 
(see Squire, 1981) or if urban informal sector workers think of an urban informal  sector  job  
as a permanent source of  income (see  Sethuraman, 1981).Moreover, most of the  theoretical 
models on  the graduation  theory adopts  partial  equilibrium  analysis. Yet  there  are  many  
factors,  such  as  an imbalance of supply  and  demand  in  the analysis of  the  development  
of  a Less  Developed  Country  (LDC), intersectoral linkages etc., that  partial  equilibrium  
analysis  cannot address. So, it is desirable to conduct a more general equilibrium analysis of 
job-search in order to highlight the process of job searching.  
 
This  paper  builds  on  the  two-sector  labour  market  model  of  Fields (1975,1989),  by  
introducing  capital  and  international  trade  into  Fields’ framework. Fields (1989) argues  
that  distinguishing between ex-ante and ex-post allocation of  the labour force is important  
for  understanding  the effects  on  the  unemployment  rate. He  finds  that  as  long  as  rural  
migrants have a positive probability of finding a job in the urban sector , ex-ante and ex-post  
labour  forces  will  differ,  affecting  the  unemployment  rate. In particular,  Fields  (1989)  
argues  that  in  this  setup,  “given  a  constant agricultural wage, a more efficient on-the-job 
search from agriculture lowers the urban unemployment rate in equilibrium”. However, 
unlike Fields (1989), we assume a flexible and market determined rural sector wage. The present 
paper examines the role of search intensity and the inflow of foreign capital on 
                                                 
1
 The ILO/UNDP employment mission report  on Kenya (1972) suggested some characteristics of the 
informal sector as easy entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, 
small scale of operation, low productivity, labour intensive technology, unregulated market, lack of 
govt. support etc.  
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unemployment and on social welfare. In  particular,  it  attempts  to  show  that in  a  job-
search  model for a small open economy with two factors of production, labour and capital,  
some of the results obtained in Fields get altered dramatically if  capital  is  mobile across the 
sectors.   
 
2.  The model  
 
The paper builds a two-sector job-search model for a small open economy. The two sectors 
are the rural sector (Sector1) and the urban sector (Sector 2). 1X  is the export good which is 
produced in Sector 1 and 2X  is the import good, produced in Sector 2. The assumption of 
small open economy gives constant product prices in each sector. In the existing theoretical 
literature on trade and development the developing countries are considered as capital scarce 
and abundant in the supply of labour. Naturally, these economies are considered to be the 
exporters of labour-intensive (agricultural) commodities and importers of capital-intensive 
manufacturing commodities. 
 
The two sectors use both labour and capital as inputs.2 The production function of all the 
sectors are subject to the Law of constant return to scale and diminishing marginal 
productivity to each input. All the markets are competitive and in the long run equilibrium, 
product price is matched exactly by the unit cost of production in each sector. Capital is 
specific to each sector. The rural sector uses domestic capital and the urban sector uses 
foreign capital. So, we have different rentals on capital in the two sectors. 
 
The urban formal sector’s wage rate is institutionally given. Urban unemployment exists in 
our stylized economy as urban job seekers devote full time for searching urban jobs and all of 
them do not get high paid urban jobs. The unsuccessful urban job seekers stay in the urban 
                                                 
2
 In this model we assume away the other factors like educational skills and innovation activities. 
These factors lead to externality. 
  
5 
 
sector being unemployed. 
The following notations are used in the model: 
1X  =level of output produced in Sector 1; 2X = level of output produced in Sector 2; a ji  = 
amount of the jth input required to produce one unit of the ith commodity; kL   = ex-ante amount 
of labour in the kth job-search strategy, k =1, 2 ; Li    =ex-post level of employment in ith sector; 
1P    =1(commodity 1 is the numeraire); 2P  = world price of commodity 2; 2
* (1 )2P t P= + = tariff-
inclusive domestic price of commodity 2; t   = ad-valorem rate of tariff; 1W  = rural wage rate; 
*
2W  
= exogenously fixed urban wage rate;  R1 = rate of return on domestic capital; 2R  = rate of 
return on foreign capital; ρ  = probability of getting urban jobs; ϕ = efficiency on-the- job search 
in the rural sector; L =total labour endowment in the economy; KD = stock of domestic capital in 
the economy; KF = inflow of foreign capital in the economy;U  = level of urban unemployment; 
µ  = rate of urban unemployment; Di = domestic demand for the ith goods; M = demand for the 
importable goods; Y = national income at domestic prices; ^ = proportional change. 
 
The general equilibrium structure of the model is as follows. 
The competitive profit conditions are given by the price unit cost equality: 
11111 =+ KaRLaW           (1) 
* *(1 )2 2 2 2 2 2W a R a t P PL K+ = + =         (2) 
The probability of getting urban formal sector job is: 
1 2
2 2a X L LLρ ϕ = / (  +  )                 (3) 
where 1 2( )L Lϕ +  is the total number of job seekers. 
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It is assumed that each worker searches for urban formal sector jobs, perhaps, because of its 
highest paying potentials. We consider two different job-search strategies: The first strategy 
describes full time jobs search as remaining unemployed at the beginning. We find this type 
of job search in Harris–Todaro (1970), Harberger (1971), Mincer (1976), Gramlich (1970), 
Stiglitz (1982) and Mcdonald and Solow (1985) and Fields (1989). If a person, searching full 
time for urban formal sector jobs, becomes successful, he can earn high urban formal wage 
with a specific probability of getting urban formal sector job and earns zero, as unemployed 
if he becomes unsuccessful. The second strategy is to remain in the rural sector and search 
part time for urban formal sector jobs. In this strategy, the success gives high paid urban 
formal sector jobs, while failure means to remain in the rural sector and earn rural wage. 
 
In the case of job-search, a person may get job in the sector where he does not stay at the 
beginning. Thus, the number of ex-ante job searchers differs from the ex-post labour force. 
For this reason, Fields (1989) distinguishes between the ex-ante allocation of labour among 
different search strategies and the ex-post allocation of labour among different sectors. Each 
search strategy has expected income. In equilibrium, the expected income from the two 
strategies would be equal. Thus, the allocation of labour force among the two strategies is 
given by: 
* * (1 )   2 2 1W W Wρ ϕρ ϕρ= + −                     (4) 
 
The number of people searching urban formal sector jobs from the rural sector is 1L .Out 
of 1L ; 1Lϕρ people get employment in the urban formal sector. Thus, the ex-post number of 
workers in the rural sector is:  
1(1 )   1 1a X LL ϕρ= −            (5)                                                                
 
The fixed amount of total labour force in the economy is not fully employed.The ex-ante and 
the ex-post endowments of labour are given by the following equations:  
   
21 LLL =+                         (6)                          
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1 1 2 2a X a X U LL L+ + =                       (7)                          
 
The endowments of capital are fixed and fully employed. The full employment of domestic 
as well as foreign capital is given by: 
1 1a X KK D=                                                                                                                 (8) 
2 2a X KK F=                                                                                                                          (9) 
 
The welfare of this small open economy is national income at domestic prices, which is given 
as follows.3 Foreign capital income is completely repatriated. 
*
1 2 2 2 2Y X P X tP M R KF= + + −                                                                                           (10) 
or, *( ) ( )1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2Y W a X R K W a X R K tP M R KL D L F F= + + + + −  
or, *1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2Y W a X W a X R K tP ML L D= + + +                         (10.1) 
In Equation (10.1) 1 1 1W a XL and
*
2 2 2W a XL are the wage incomes of the workers in the two 
sectors, respectively. 1R KD denotes the rental income of domestic capital. Finally, 2tP M is 
the amount of tariff revenue of the government from the import of commodity 2 which is 
completely transferred to the consumers as lump-sum payments. 
 
The domestic demand for the two goods is: 
),*2(11 YPDD =                     (11) 
where 0)*2/1(11 <∂∂= PDD ; and, 0)/1(12 >∂∂= YDD  
                                                 
3
 It has been rightly pointed out by one of the two anonymous referees that considering national 
income (or per capita national income) as an indicator of welfare may sometimes be misleading. This 
is because despite a substantial increase in national income a lion’s share of the population may not at 
all be benefited if there exists a high degree of income inequality among various groups of the 
population in the economy. In such a situation the welfare measure of Sen (1974), defined as the per-
capita income multiplied by one minus the Gini-coefficient of the income distribution, is an 
appropriate measure of welfare of the different groups of population. Keeping this limitation in mind 
we, however, continue to measure social welfare in terms of national income as our prime objective is 
not to focus on income inequality. 
  
8 
 
and ),*2(22 YPDD =                                                                                                              (12) 
where 0)*2/2(21 <∂∂= PDD ; and, ( / ) 022 2D D Y= ∂ ∂ >  
 
The import demand for the commodity 2 is: 
22 XDM −=                                                                                                                        (13) 
 
Using Equations (4), (5), (6) into Equation (3) we get, 
* *
1 1 1 2 2 2 2W a X LW W a XL Lρ= −                                                                                          (3.1) 
 
Using Equations (3.1), (4), (5), (6), (12) and (13) into Equation (10.1) we get, 
* *{ ( , ) }2 1 2 2 2 2Y W L R K tP D P Y XDρ= + + −                                                                        (10.2)                                                               
We can determine 2R  from Equation (2), given tPW ,2,
*
2 . Thus, we get 2Ka . Then, 
Equation (9) gives 2X , given KF . Now, from Equation (1) we get 1R  as a function of 1W ; 
i.e., ),1(1 WgR = where 0<′g . Thus, 1Ka  is also a function of 1W . Equation (4) shows that 
ρ  also depends on 1W  ; i.e., 0),1( >′= hWhρ .
4
 Solving Equations (3.1) and (8) we 
get 1W and 1X  given FK . Then, we get 1R and ρ . Next,U  is obtained from Equation (7), 
given L . 1L is obtained from Equation (5) and 2L  from Equation (6).We find Y  from 
Equation (10.2). Finally, we get , ,1 2D D M  from Equations (11), (12) and (13) respectively. 
      
 
 
                                                 
4
 From Equation (4) we get,  
( )
( ) *1 1 2
1
0
1
d
dW W W
ϕρρ
ϕ ϕ
 
− 
= >    + −   
 
This implies that given the urban wage and the job search intensity, if the rural wage rate rises, ρ has 
to increase to maintain expected income equalization from the two search strategies. 
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3.  Comparative static: 
 
We are now going to examine the effects of search intensity and foreign capital inflow on 
urban unemployment and national income at domestic prices.  
 
We are going to use some more symbols which are as follows. 
jiθ = distributive share of the j th factor in i th sector with ,j L K= ; and, 1,2i = ; jiλ = 
allocative share of the j th factor in i th sector; iσ = elasticity of factor substitution in i th 
sector.   
 
Total differential of Equation (4) yields: 
*
ˆ
ˆ ˆ{( / ) 1} (1 )2 1 1W W Wρ ϕρϕ ϕρ= − + −                                                                                      (14) 
 
Totally differentiating Equations (3.1) and (8) we get the following results5: 
( )
*
* * 2 *2ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ1 11 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1
W
W W W W W X W W KL L L L FW
λ λ σ ρ ϕρ λ ρ ϕ ϕ λ
 
  
− − − + = − −
      
 
    (15)                    
                                              
ˆ ˆ
  01 1 1 1 1W XL Kσ θ θ+ =                                                          (16) 
 
Solving Equations (15) and (16) one gets, 
* 2 *
ˆ
1 2 2 2 1 0
ˆ 1
W W WK
W
θ ρ ϕ
ϕ
  
   = − <
 ∆      
                                                                                     (17)  
*
ˆ
1 1 2 2 0
ˆ
W WK L
KF
θ λ 
  = − >
∆ 
 
                                                                                                (18) 
                                                 
5
 See Appendix A.1 for detailed derivations. 
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* 2 *
ˆ
1 1 1 2 2 1 0
ˆ 1
X W WL
W
σ θ ρ ϕ
ϕ
  
   = − − >
 ∆      
                                                                               (19) 
*
ˆ
1 1 1 2 2 0
ˆ
X WL L
KF
σ θ λ 
  = − <
∆ 
 
                                                                                            (20). 
                                                                                
where ( ) ( )* 1 01 1 1 1 1 2W WL K Kλ θ σ θ ρ ϕρ∆ = − − − < ,   if ( )1 1Kσ θ≥                                (21) 
It is important to note that if the production function of sector 1 is of Cobb-Douglas type we 
have 1 1σ = . So 0∆ < without of any restrictions on the parameters. 
 
3.1. Effects onU : 
 
The total differential of Equation (7) yields6: 
*
* 2 2 11 1 2
1
ˆ
ˆ( / )       0
W
L WL W
U
U
λ σ ρ ϕ
ϕ
 
 
−
  
 
= <
∆
                                                                    (22) 
 
 
( ) ( ){ }*2ˆ ˆ( / ) 11 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
                                                         (-)
L LU K W WF L K K LU
λ
λ θ σ θ ρ ϕρ λ σ
 
 
= − − − − − 
    ∆                      (23) 
So, from Equation (23) we find that ˆ ˆ( / ) 0U KF <  if ( )1 1Lρ ϕρ λ− > .                                                 
            
Here, the unemployment rate is: 
{ / ( )} [1/{1 ( / )}]2 2 2 2U U a X a X UL Lµ = + = +                                                              (24) 
 
Result (24) shows that µ  also falls whenϕ  or KF  rises. 
                                                 
6
 See Appendix A.2. 
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These lead to the following proposition:               
 
Proposition 1: Both an improvement in job-search efficiency and the inflow of foreign 
capital lower the volume and the rate of urban unemployment if capital is specific to each 
sector.7  
 
3.2. Effect on welfare: 
The total differential of Equation. (10.2) and then using (11) gives:8 
( )*ˆ * 2 2 1 02 1 1 1 1 1 1ˆ 1
              
             (-)                                                           (-)
WY V W L W R KL K L DY W
ρ ϕ λ θ σ θ
ϕ
 
       
= − − − >        ∆    
 
                              (25)                                        
( ){ } ( ) ( )
*
* 1 2 21
ˆ ˆ 2 1 1 2 2( / ) ( ) 01
                          2 2 1 1 1
P XKW W tV L L KY K tF Y
tP X W L
θ
ρ ϕρ λ θ θ
λ σ
 
 
− − −
 = − <+∆  
−  
                         (26) 
                                                 
7
 Theoretically, the specific factor models have been developed with three factors and two goods 
cases (Jones 1971, Samuelson 1971). Imperfect factor mobility is also observed both in large and 
small economies. We find capital immobility in developing countries like India and China. In 
India, as much as 80% of investment capital in small and medium-sized firms is from 
informal sources and internal funds.  We observe strong correlation between district wealth 
and investment in India (Sharma, S 2008). 
 Immobility of capital may occur due to transportation barriers, language and cultural barriers, 
information barriers, heavy reliance on specialized equipment and knowledge etc.So, there may exists 
some complex conditions in a small open economy that lead to imperfect capital mobility within the 
economy (Mavromatis and Verikios 2008). 
 
8
 See Appendix A.3. 
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From (26) it follows that ˆ ˆ( / ) 0Y KF <  if ( / )2 2t L Kθ θ≥ .                                                                                                  
These give us the following proposition:                     
Proposition 2: An improvement in job-search intensity raises social welfare, whereas an inflow 
of foreign capital lowers this. 
 
We explain Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 as follows: As job search is more efficient for 
the rural workers, a demerit of search for a job in the urban sector while staying in the rural 
area is smaller. So, the value of being a rural worker is higher, which encourages workers to 
stay in the rural area, choosing the part time job searching strategy and therefore, 1L rises. 
Given the labour constraint, 2L falls. However, the urban production remains unchanged due 
to fixed capital and no change in factor intensity in this sector.9 So, the level of 
unemployment falls as the number of full time job seekers (ex-ante labour force in the urban 
sector) reduces and the ex-post level of urban employment remains fixed. Equation (24) 
shows that as U  falls, µ  also falls, given 2 2a XL .Again, as more and more workers stay in 
the rural area, rural wage rate falls and the rental rate rises to maintain price- unit cost 
equality at the competitive equilibrium. The falling rural wage lowers probability of getting 
jobs to maintain the expected income equality between the two job search strategies. Thus, at 
the initial equilibrium, the improved search intensity lowers wage income and raises rental 
income, keeping the tariff revenue unchanged. The rise in rental income outweighs the fall in 
wage income and so, the domestic factor income rises and so also the social welfare. 
 
 On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital expands the urban sector and contracts the 
rural sector. At the same time, it also raises the probability of getting urban jobs. So, the 
number of people adopting the strategy of full time job searching rises. The magnification 
                                                 
9
 Here, factor intensity means the ratio of ex-post capital to ex-post labour. Here, ex-ante labour force 
in the urban sector changes but not the ex-post labour force. So, factor intensity remains the same 
even if 2L falls, when capital is fixed. 
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effect implies that the level of unemployment in the urban sector falls if ( ) 1 1Lρ ϕρ λ− > . 
Thus, the employment–unemployment ratio in the urban sector rises and this lowers the rate 
of unemployment. Further, the inflow of foreign capital raises wage income by upgrading 
rural wage and probability of getting urban jobs. At the same time, it lowers rental income on 
domestic capital. At the initial equilibrium, it also lowers tariff revenue. These two effects 
jointly outweigh the wage effect and so the domestic factor income falls if 2
2
Lt
K
θ
θ
 
 ≥
 
 
 and so 
also the social welfare. Hence, an inflow of foreign capital in this job search model lowers 
both unemployment rate and social welfare. 
                                         
4.  An extension: mobile capital case: 
 
In this section we relax the assumption of fixed capital and capital is assumed to be mobile 
between the two sectors. Thus, we have a common rate of return on capital. We assume that 
sector 1 is more labour-intensive (less capital-intensive) vis-à-vis sector 2 in value sense. 
This implies that
*
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )L L L L L L
K K K K K K
W a W a
a a
θ θ λ λ
θ θ λ λ> ⇔ > ⇒ > . This means that if sector 1 
is more labour-intensive (less capital-intensive) vis-à-vis sector 2 in value sense it is also 
more labour-intensive (less capital-intensive) than sector 2 in physical sense. 
 
Equations (1) and (2) of the previous section become: 
 
11 1 1W a RaL K+ =                                                                                                                      (1.1) 
( )* * 12 2 2 2 2W a Ra P P tL K+ = = +                                                                                              (2.1)                                                                   
where R stands for the common return to capital in both the sectors. 
The two capital endowment equations of the previous section are changed into one: 
1 1 2 2a X a X K K KK K F D+ = + =                                                                                            (8.1) 
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Here ( )D FK K K= + is the aggregate capital stock of the economy (domestic plus foreign). 
Equation (10) becomes: 
*
1 2 2 2Y X P X tP M RKF= + + −                                           (10.3)                                                      
Equivalently, 
* *
 { ( , ) }2 2 2 2 2Y W L RK tP D P Y XDρ= + + −                                           (10.4)                      
All other equations are same as the previous section.  
 
Here, R  is determined from (2.1) and then 1W  from (1.1). Thus, all a ji s are determined. 
Now, (3.1) and (8.1) give and 1 2X X . Equation (4) yields ρ .Then, we get 
1L from Equation 
(5) and 2L from Equation (6). U  is obtained from (7). We get Y  from (10.3). Then, 2D  and 
M  are obtained from Equations (11) and (12). 
                                            
Totally differentiating Equation (4) we get, 
 
*
2
ˆ ˆ1
1
W
W
ρ ϕρϕ
  
  
= −    
  
                                                                                                             (27)  
Totally differentiating Equations (3.1) and (8.1) and using (27) we get,10 
 
*
ˆ 1 * 21 2 1 02 2ˆ 1
X W
WK W
λ ρ ϕ
ϕ
  
     = − >   ′∆        
                                                                               (28) 
                                                 
10
 See Appendix B.1. 
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ˆ 1 *1 0
ˆ 2 2
X
WLK
λ
 
   = − < 
′∆   
 
                                                                                                   (29) 
*
ˆ 1 * 22 2 1 01 2ˆ 1
X W
WK W
λ ρ ϕ
ϕ
  
     = − − <   ′∆        
                                                                           (30) 
ˆ 12 0
ˆ 1 1
X
WLK
λ
 
   = > 
′∆   
 
                                                                                                       (31) 
where ( )* 01 1 2 2 1 2W WL K K Lλ λ λ λ′∆ = − > , (since sector 1is assumed to be labour-intensive 
relative to sector 2 in value sense).                                                                                       (32)                                        
 
The total differential of Equation (7) and then using (B.1.3) and (B.1.4) yields11: 
( )2 * *2 2ˆ ˆ( / ) 1 02 1 1 2
1
                  (+)                                          (-)
W W
U L K L KU W
ρ
ϕ ϕ λ λ λ λ
  
  
= − − <
  ′∆  
  
               (33) 
 and,                                                                         
 
( )*1 2ˆ ˆ( / ) 02 1
                    (+)               (+)
L LU K W W
U
λ λ 
= − > 
 ′∆                                                                                       (34)                 
These lead to the following proposition:               
Proposition 3: An improvement in job-search efficiency lowers the volume of urban 
unemployment and raises the rate of unemployment, while the inflow of foreign capital gives 
the opposite results if capital is mobile between the two sectors.  
 
The total differential of Equation (10.4) and then using (27), (32) gives12: 
                                                 
11
 See Appendix B.2. 
 
12
 See Appendix B.3. 
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( )
* 2 *
2 2 2 2 1ˆ
ˆ( / ) 1 0
1 12 22
W W tP X KY L
WY tP D
ρ ϕ λ
ϕ
      
= − + >    ′∆
−        
; and,                                          (35) 
 ( ) ( )*1 2 1ˆ ˆ( / ) 02 21 2 22
X X LY K P P
LY tP D
θ 
 
= − <
 
′∆ − 
 
, ( )* 02 2P P − <  ∵                                          (36) 
This gives us the following proposition:                               
Proposition 4: An improvement in job-search intensity is welfare improving, whereas an inflow 
of foreign capital is welfare reducing. 
 
We may now give an intuitive explanation of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4: Here also as 
search intensity improves 1L rises and 2L  falls. Again, as ϕ  rises the capital intensive sector 
contracts and the labour intensive sector expands. So, the ex-post level of employment in the 
urban sector falls. The level of unemployment also falls due to the specific factor intensity 
condition. Now, the ratio of unemployment to the ex-post labour force in the urban sector 
rises because the denominator reduces more substantially than the fall occurring in the 
numerator and so the rate of unemployment also rises. Again, as the job search efficiency 
rises, the wage income rises through the rise in the probability of getting urban jobs and tariff 
revenue also rises as 2X falls. Thus, total domestic factor income rises and so also social 
welfare. On the other hand, the inflow of foreign capital expands the capital intensive sector 
and contracts the labour intensive sector13.Both the ex-post and the ex-ante level of 
employment fall in the rural sector. In the urban sector, both these levels rise. So, more 
labour is now available in the urban sector, but only a portion of it is absorbed. This 
accentuates the problem of unemployment. Here, the unemployment is the urban 
unemployment and the employment is the ex-post urban labour force. The ratio of urban 
unemployment to the ex-post labour force in the urban sector falls because the denominator 
rises more substantially than the rise in the numerator and so the unemployment rate falls. At 
                                                 
13
 We assume that domestic capital and the foreign capital are perfect substitutes. So, the Rybczynsky 
effect works following an increase in the inflow of foreign capital. 
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the initial equilibrium, the inflow of foreign capital lowers the volume of import as 2X  rises. 
So, given t, *2P  the income from tariff revenues falls and the rental income rises, keeping 
wage income unchanged. Here, the fall in tariff revenue outweighs the rise in rental income. 
So, the domestic factor income falls and so also the social welfare. 
 
5. Concluding remarks: 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on rural-urban migration and labour force 
allocation across sectors, in analyzing the dynamics of employment and unemployment. One 
implication of this analysis, in particular of the Harris-Todaro model (Harris and Todaro, 
1970), is that it predicts an unemployment rate much higher than the ones observed in the 
data. The present paper extends the Fields’ (1989) model by introducing capital and 
international trade into the Fields’ framework and examines the effects of job-search 
efficiency and inflow of foreign capital on unemployment and social welfare. We consider 
two different cases: fixed capital case as well as mobile capital case. Our analysis shows that 
in both cases the improved job-search efficiency lowers the volume of unemployment. 
However, the rate of unemployment falls in the fixed capital case and rises in the mobile 
capital case if job-search efficiency improves. Thus, the result obtained in the mobile capital 
case is partly counterproductive to the Fields’ (1989) proposition: 1. Moreover, the increased 
job-search efficiency is welfare enhancing in both the fixed capital case and the mobile 
capital case. 
 
The paper also shows that the inflow of foreign capital lowers unemployment rate and social 
welfare in both cases. However, such inflow lowers the volume of unemployment in the 
fixed capital case and raises it when the capital is mobile.  
 
Thus our results show that the nature of capital, whether it is fixed or mobile, plays important 
role to examine the impact of job-search efficiency and inflow of foreign capital on 
unemployment and social welfare. In the case of fixed capital, improvement in job search 
efficiency is better than the inflow of foreign capital because the former option allows an 
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increase in social welfare. If capital is mobile between the two sectors, increased job search 
efficiency raises both the unemployment rate and social welfare. However, the foreign capital 
inflow lowers both the unemployment rate and social welfare if capital is mobile. Thus, in 
the case of mobile capital which policy is better than other depends upon the objective of the 
economy: whether to reduce unemployment rate or to raise social welfare.  
 
 
Appendices: 
 
Appendix A.1:  
 
The total differential of Equation (3.1) is, 
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2W LW W LX W La LW W LX W LaL L L L L L Lλ λ λ ρρ λ λ+ + = − −              (A.1.1) 
 
Using Equation (16) and the definition of elasticity of factor substitution we get, 
( )
*
* 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
1
W
W LW W LX W L W LW WL L L W
λ λ λ σ ρ ϕρ ϕρϕ
  
  + − = − + −
      
 
                                                                                                             
*
ˆ
2 2 2W LXLλ−  
 
or, ( )
*
* * 2 2ˆ ˆ
ˆ1 11 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
1
W
W W L W W W X WL L L W
λ λ σ ρ ϕρ λ ρ ϕϕ
 
  
− − − + = −
      
 
 
                                                                                                                    
*
ˆ
2 2 2W XLλ−   
                                                                                                                                        (A.1.2) 
From Equation (9) we get, 
ˆ ˆ
2X KF=  
Putting this into (A.1.2) we get, 
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( )
*
* * 2 2ˆ ˆ
ˆ1 11 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
1
*
ˆ
                                                                                                   2 2
W
W W L W W W X WL L L W
W KL F
λ λ σ ρ ϕρ λ ρ ϕϕ
λ
 
  
− − − + = −
      
 
−
                 (15) 
                        
Solving Equations (15) and (16) we get, 
( )
*
2 * *2ˆ ˆ
ˆ1/ 11 1 2 2 2
1
W
W W W KK L FW
θ ρ ϕϕ λ
  
  
= ∆ − −
      
                                                      (A.1.3)  
and, 
( )
*
2 * *2 ˆ
ˆ
 1
ˆ 2 2 21/1 1 1 1
                                           
W
W W KL FX WL
ρ ϕϕ λ
σ θ
  
  
− −
  = − ∆    
 
 
                                                 (A.1.4) 
 
Appendix A.2:    
 
The total differential of Equation (7) is given by: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 2 2 1 1 1
UX X U WL L LL
λ λ λ σ + + = 
 
                                                                              (A.2.1) 
 
Using Equations (A.1.3), (A1.4) and (9) into Equation (A.2.1) we get, 
( )
( )
*
2 * *2ˆ ˆ
ˆ1/ 11 1 1 2 2 2
1
*
2 * *2 ˆ
ˆ
 12 2 2
                                      1 /1 1 1 1
                                           
WU U W W KL K L FL W
W
W W KL FWL L
λ σ θ ρ ϕϕ λ
ρ ϕϕ λλ σ θ
  
    
= ∆ − − +          
  
  
− −
  ∆  
 

ˆ
2KL Fλ



−
 
 

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or, ( )
*
* 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ1/ 11 1 2 2 2
1
WL LU W K KL L F L FU W U
λ σ ρ ϕϕ λ λ
  
     
= ∆ − − −            
 
or, ( )
* *
* 2 2 1 1 2ˆ ˆ
ˆ1/ 1 11 1 2 2
1
W WL L LU W KL L FU W U
λ σ
λ σ ρ ϕϕ λ
   
      
= ∆ − − +      ∆      
   
                (A.2.2) 
 
Appendix A.3: 
 
The total differential of Equation (10.4) gives: 
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1 )2 22 2 1 1 2 2 2YY tP D W L R K R tP X XDρρ− = + −                                                                (A.3.1)                     
 
Suppose, 2m stands for the marginal propensity to consume commodity 2. So, 
*( / )2 2 2m P D Y= ∂ ∂ = (1 )( / )2 2P t D Y+ ∂ ∂ , (0< 2m <1); 
or, 2 ( / )2 2(1 )
m
P D Y
t
= ∂ ∂
+
; 
21 (1 )21 (1 ) (1 )
tm t m
t t
+ −
∴ − =
+ +
 
Substituting this into (A.3.1) we get, 
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ( )[ ]2 1 1 2 2 2
VY W L R K R tP X XDY
ρρ∴ = + −                                                                    (A.3.2) 
where 
2
(1 ) 0
1 (1 )
tV
t m
+
= >
+ −
                                                                                       
 
Using Equations (11), (1) and (9) into (A.3.2) we get, 
( )
*
* * 21 2ˆ ˆ
ˆ( ) 1 12 1 1 2
1 1
WV LY W L R K W W LDY WK
θ
ρ ϕρ ρ ϕ ϕ
θ
      
= − − + −         
        
                                                                                                   
ˆ( ) 2 2
V
tP X KFY
−                    (A.3.3) 
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Using Equation (A.1.3) we get, 
( )
*
* 2 * *1 1 2 ˆ
ˆ1 12 1 2 2 2
1 1
ˆ ( )
*
* 2 2 ˆ
ˆ
                                                          12 2 2
1
WL KW L R K W W KD L FWKVY
Y W
W L tP X KFW
θ θ
ρ ϕρ ρ ϕϕ λ
θ
ρ ϕ ϕ
        
− − × − −   ∆        
=  
  
  + − −
   
   
   
 
or,                                                                                                                                                                                  
( ){ }
( ){ }
*
2 * *2
ˆ1 12 2 1 1 1
ˆ 1
* *
ˆ
 12 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
                                               
W
W W L R K LK D LV WY
Y
W L R K W tP X KK D L L F
ρ ϕ ρ ϕρ θ θ ϕ
ρ ϕρ θ θ λ
  
  
− − − + ∆ −
     
=     ∆   
  
− − + ∆
    
  
or, 
( ){ }
( ){ } ( )
*
2 * 2
ˆ12 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ
* *12 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 ˆ
 
2 2 1 1 1
                                               
W
W L W R KL K D LW
VY
Y W W LW tP XL K L KFtP X WL
ρ ϕ λ θ σ θ ϕ
ρ ϕρ λ θ λ
λ σ
  
  
− − − −
      
=   ∆     
− − −
  
  
−    
        
or, 
 
( ){ }
( ){ } ( ) ( )
*
2 * 2
ˆ12 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ *
* 1 2 212 1 1 2 2 ˆ1
 
2 2 1 1 1
                                            
W
W L W R KL K D LW
VY P XY KW W tL L Kt KF
tP X WL
ρ ϕ λ θ σ θ ϕ
θ
ρ ϕρ λ θ θ
λ σ
  
  
− − − −
     
     =   ∆      
− − −
   +    
  
−    
   
                          (A.3.4)          
 
  
22 
 
Appendix B.1:    
 
Totally differentiating Equation (3.1) and using Equation (27) we get, 
* 2 * *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ{( / ) 1}2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1W X W X W W WL Lλ λ ρ ϕϕ+ = −                                                           (B.1.1) 
 
Totally differentiating Equation (8.1) we get, 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
2 2 1 1X X KK K Fλ λ+ =                                                                                                   (B.1.2) 
Solving (B.1.1) and (B.1.2) we get, 
*
2 * *2ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1/ ) 11 2 2 2 2
1
W
X W W KK LW
λ ρ ϕϕ λ
  
  
′= ∆ − −
      
                                                       (B.1.3) 
*
* 2 2ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1/ ) 12 1 1 1 2
1
W
X W K WL K W
λ λ ρ ϕϕ
  
  
′= ∆ − −
      
                                                         (B.1.4) 
                                        
Appendix B.2:  
 
The total differential of Equation (7) is: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ 01 1 2 2X X UUL Lλ λ+ + =                                                                                             (B.2.1) 
Using Equations (B.1.3) and (B.1.4) into (B.2.1) we get, 
 
*
1 2 * *2ˆ ˆ
ˆ11 2 2 2 2
1
*
1 * 2 2 ˆˆ
                    12 1 1 1 2
1
W
UU W W KL K LW
W
W K WL L K W
λ λ ρ ϕϕ λ
λ λ λ ρ ϕφ
  
    
= − − −    ′∆      
  
    
− − −    ′∆      
                                       
( ) ( )2 * * *2 2 1 2ˆ ˆˆ1 2 1 1 2 2 1
1
                    
W W L LU W W KL K L KU W U
ρ λ λ
ϕ λ λ λ λ ϕ
  
  ∴ = − − + −
  ′ ′∆ ∆  
  
                  (B.2.2) 
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Appendix B.3:  
 
The total differential of Eq. (10.4) is: 
 
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ( )[ X X ]2 2 2 2
VY W L RKK tP
Y
ρρ= + −                                                        (B.3.1) 
 
Using Equations (27) and (B.1.4) we get, 
 
* X2 * 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1ˆ ˆ
ˆ( ) 12
1
W tP X tP WV K LY W L RK K
Y W
λ λ
ρ ϕ ϕ
           
= − + + −      ′ ′∆ ∆           
        (B.3.2) 
 
Using Equation (32) into Equation (B.3.2) we get, 
 
( )
*
2 * 2 2 2 1
ˆ12
1
ˆ ( )
* X1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 ˆ
             
W tP X KW L
W
VY
Y X X P tP W a XL L L K
L L
λ
ρ ϕ ϕ
θ θ
       
− +    ′∆      
=  
  
−  + − 
′ ∆  
   
                    
or,  
 
( ){ }
*
2 * 2 2 2 1
ˆ12
ˆ 1( )
*1 2 ˆ
                           2 1 2 2 1
W tP X KW L
WVY
Y
X X
P tP KL L LL
λ
ρ ϕ ϕ
θ θ θ
       
− +    ′∆     =  
 
 
+ − − 
′∆ 
 
 
or,  
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( )
*
2 * 2 2 2 1
ˆ12
1
ˆ ( )
*1 2 ˆ
                                             1 2 2
W tP X KW L
WVY
Y X X
P P KLL
λ
ρ ϕ ϕ
θ
       
− + +    ′∆      =
 
   
−  
′∆    
                               (B.3.3) 
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